Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Interest by Boyle, James
OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION, PATENT 
INJUNCTIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
JAMES BOYLE† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the difficulties that high technology 
markets pose for patent law and, in particular, for patent 
injunctions.  It then outlines the ways in which “open source 
innovation” is unusually vulnerable to patent injunctions.  It 
argues that courts can recognize this vulnerability, and respond to 
the particular competitive and innovative benefits of open source 
innovation, by flexibly applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
eBay v. MercExchange.  Having dealt with the lamentable failure 
of the International Trade Commission to exercise a similar 
flexibility in its own patent jurisprudence, despite statutory and 
constitutional provisions that counsel otherwise, the Article 
concludes with some recommendations for reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
 In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,1 the Supreme Court laid 
down the standards for granting permanent injunctions in patent 
infringement actions.  Overruling years of Federal Circuit precedent, the 
Court decisively rejected the existing presumption that, once a court finds a 
patent has been infringed, an injunction should issue.  Instead, the Court 
held that permanent injunctions in patent law are governed by the same 
equitable four-part test as injunctions in other areas of law. 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.2 
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1 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
2 Id. at 391. 
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A. The Challenge of High Technology Markets 
 High technology markets—particularly those involving sequential 
innovation and the “network effects” that are typically found in products 
such as software or communications devices—pose a number of distinct 
challenges in applying this test. In these markets, business models and 
methods of innovation vary widely.  Great sensitivity is needed to make 
sure the law is applied in a way that is attentive to potentially disparate 
effects on a particular structure of innovation or type of competition.  It is 
exactly this kind of sensitivity to context that the eBay test is intended to 
foster. 
B. Benefits of Open Source Technological Development 
 This Article focuses on open innovation and, in particular, on “open 
source”3 methods of technological development—in which a wide network 
of developers participate in building on a shared technological base that is 
freely available to all.  Classic examples include the operating system 
Linux, the Firefox browser, the Apache web server, and the Android 
operating system for mobile devices.  Free and open source software powers 
everything from phones and search engines to ATMs and TiVo digital video 
recorders; together the companies deploying open source products make up 
a large and innovative industry sector that supports millions of jobs.  But 
this method of development is not confined to software: open source or 
open innovation methods are also found in areas ranging from synthetic 
biology to the development of artificial limbs. 
 As the Federal Trade Commission recently pointed out,4 open 
innovation and open source methods offer compelling advantages in 
fostering both competition and rapid technological development.  High 
technology markets are frequently characterized by the existence of network 
effects.  Markets tend to “tip” towards a single standard—whether a single 
operating system or a single format for high quality DVDs.  If the standard 
is proprietary, the owner can extract supracompetitive rents, while the 
coordination costs of switching to a new standard or technology lock users 
in, even if better alternatives are subsequently developed.  Consumers bear 
the cost in the form of higher prices and reduced innovation.  But when the 
technology is open source, no such hold-up is possible.  Multiple developers 
can offer competing versions, with the competition simultaneously bringing 
down prices and offering greater choice and customization.  In markets in 
                                                      
3 Because the ambit of this analysis goes beyond the software context, I do not 
generally use the terminology “Free and Open Source,” which would be appropriate 
if my subject were software alone.   
4 FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
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which both proprietary and open source products compete, the existence of 
the open source alternative provides a valuable check on potential 
monopoly power, as well as a continued prod to innovation by all of the 
companies involved, whether open source or proprietary.  Owners of 
iPhones and Android phones have benefitted both in pricing and in the 
rapid development of new features because of the competition involved—a 
competition not only between types of phones, but between different models 
of innovation.  This spur to competitiveness, yielding lower prices and 
accelerated innovation, clearly benefits consumers and the public interest.  
Finally, by allowing a wide range of participants, small and large, to share 
in the process of innovation on a layer of open technology, society gets the 
benefit of diverse approaches to the same technological puzzles.  Open 
source offers a type of technological “species diversity,” in contrast to the 
proprietary monocultures. 
C. The Vulnerabilities of Open Source 
 If open source innovation has great social benefits in fostering 
competition and innovation, it also has particular vulnerabilities.  First, 
precisely because open source development takes place in a network and 
allows both small and large players to participate by building on a common 
technology, it is particularly susceptible to attack and disruption.  A 
proprietary monopolist fully internalizes both the costs and benefits of 
policing its technology and its intellectual property.  Members of an open 
innovation network, however, do not.  Individual members can be “picked 
off,” forced to abandon promising lines of technological development, or to 
pay ruinous “stacked” royalties because the costs of litigation are too 
burdensome for any one member of the network to bear.  It is in this context 
that the threat of injunctions is particularly worrisome.  In fast-moving 
technology markets, the dead stop forced by an injunction can be enough to 
doom a product.  An entire network of innovation could be shut down by an 
injunction obtained against a single small participant who lacks the 
resources necessary to challenge the patent or defend against the injunction. 
 Second, most of these markets are characterized by strongly 
cumulative innovation.  A finished product may “read on” literally 
thousands of potential patents.  In these markets, as Justice Kennedy noted 
in eBay, there are considerable concerns with low patent quality and with 
the vagueness of the patents themselves.5  Even the most scrupulous 
respecter of intellectual property can be subject to hold-up by a company 
claiming its patent has been infringed.  To quote the Federal Trade 
Commission: 
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Under some circumstances, however, the threat of an injunction can 
lead an infringer to pay higher royalties than the patentee could have 
obtained in a competitive technology market.  At the time a 
manufacturer faces an infringement allegation, switching to an 
alternative technology may be very expensive if it has sunk costs in 
production using the patented technology.  That may be true even if 
choosing the alternative earlier would have entailed little additional 
cost.  If so, the patentee can use the threat of an injunction to obtain 
royalties covering not only the market value of the patented invention, 
but also a portion of the costs that the infringer would incur if it were 
enjoined and had to switch.  This higher royalty based on switching 
costs is called the “hold-up” value of the patent.  Patent hold-up can 
overcompensate patentees, raise prices to consumers who lose the 
benefits of competition among technologies, and deter innovation by 
manufacturers facing the risk of hold-up.6 
Large firms protect themselves from the vulnerability inherent in this 
situation by purchasing huge war chests of patents, not for their inherent 
value but to threaten “mutual assured destruction” should their (large) 
competitors start a patent war.  But an open innovation or open source 
network is at best imperfectly protected by such tactics, and remains 
vulnerable in any event to hold-up by “non-practicing entities”—patent 
trolls who can use the threat of an injunction to extract large rents without 
being subject to attack in return because they never actually make anything. 
 Empirical studies and theoretical economic models confirm the 
dangers described here are real.  For example: 
• Preliminary injunctions claims are disproportionately 
more likely to be brought by plaintiffs that are 
financially stronger and larger than the defendants—a 
troubling barrier to entry in a supposedly dynamic 
market.7  Here, the desirable heterogeneity of open 
innovation networks becomes a vulnerability.   
• Professors Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have shown 
the threat of injunctions allows for “holdup” and 
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7 “The empirical results suggest that this remedy may be available only to 
ﬁnancially stronger plaintiffs.  In univariate comparisons, disputes in which 
preliminary injunctions are requested have plaintiffs almost twice as large, in terms 
of sales, employment, and cash and equivalents, as those in disputes where 
preliminary injunctions are not requested.  The plaintiff is also signiﬁcantly more 
likely to be bigger than the defendant.”  Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the 
Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575 (2001). 
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“royalty stacking,”8 particularly in the type of 
cumulative innovation markets in which open source 
methods are most often found. 
For these reasons among others, we have empirical, experiential, and 
economic reasons to believe that the eBay factors should be applied with 
particular care to high technology markets.  The courts have actually begun 
to do so, applying several heuristics that this Article will support, with the 
scope to do still more.  There is, however, a catch. 
D. Enter the International Trade Commission 
 eBay v. MercExchange revolutionized patent injunctions in the 
federal court system, and its effects have even spread beyond patent to 
copyright.  Ironically, there is one intellectual property context in which the 
eBay standards have not been applied and where the public interest is still 
narrowly and formalistically construed.  It lies at the heart of patent law—
the very field in which eBay was announced.  The tribunal concerned is the 
International Trade Commission (ITC), now the favored destination of 
companies seeking patent injunctions.   
 Why the favored destination?  Because, according to empirical 
studies, the ITC’s favorable response to requests for patent injunctions is 
astonishingly high, between 96% and 100%.9  Thus, thirty years after the 
CAFC was set up to harmonize patent law, we have effectively developed 
two legal systems for patent injunctions in the United States, each applying 
entirely different standards and only one of them truly considering 
competitive effects and the public interest. 
 This Article details the empirical, experiential, and economic 
reasons to believe that patent injunctions can present severe anti-
competitive problems, particularly in high technology markets characterized 
by network effects, and that they can lead to royalty stacking, to “hold-up,” 
and to the chilling of competitive innovation.  Unfortunately, these concerns 
are not confined to Article III courts.  They do not vanish when one enters 
the doors of the ITC.  Yet, inexplicably and despite the presence of a clear 
statutory mandate to consider competitive issues and effects on United 
States’ consumers,10 judicial attention to them does vanish.  The CAFC may 
have been mistaken to hold that eBay did not apply to the ITC.  This Article 
will argue that it was.  But more importantly, the ITC already has a statutory 
                                                      
8 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007). 
9 Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias In Patent Infringement Cases: A 
Review Of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 
484 (2008). 
10 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d)–(f) (2006).  
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mandate to consider public interest factors, including the effect on 
competition.  So far, it has failed almost totally to do so.  But as the 
economic and legal arguments presented here will show, that stance is a 
costly mistake, one that harms both the competitive American economy and 
the American consumer.  This mistake should be rectified as soon as 
possible, either by the ITC’s own jurisprudence, by executive action, or by 
legislative clarification—all aimed at ensuring patent remedies serve, rather 
than harm, the goal of innovation they are designed to foster. 
E. Defining the Public Interest 
 First, this Article argues the Supreme Court’s test in eBay, properly 
understood, offers some constructive ways to respond to both the benefits of 
open source innovation and the threats posed to it by injunctions.  In 
particular, the third and fourth factors—the “balance of hardships” 
component and the “public interest” component—are ideally suited to allow 
recognition of the unique vulnerabilities and the unique competitive and 
innovative value of open source production.  It is precisely this kind of 
equitable context-sensitivity that the Supreme Court’s test in eBay was 
designed to reintroduce into decisions about patent injunctions.   Attention 
to the economic and empirical literature on injunctions reinforces the need 
for such an approach, and there are hints that the federal courts have begun 
to adopt one.  Nevertheless, much remains to be done. 
 Second, this Article argues the ITC’s attitude towards patent 
injunctions needs to change and change soon, largely by incorporating the 
same kinds of concerns the Supreme Court, scholars, and empiricists have 
all stressed are vital to preserving the competitive balance at the heart of 
patent law.  The ITC is not in fact required automatically to issue exclusion 
orders or cease-and-desist orders if it finds infringement of a patent, though 
that has been its practice.  All of the sections authorizing permanent or 
temporary orders of this kind have the following vital rider: “unless, after 
considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, 
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like 
or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded . . . .”11  Public 
health and welfare, competitive conditions, and the effects on competing 
products and on the availability of products to US consumers—these are 
exactly the issues the eBay factors require courts to consider. 
 The remedy to these problems is relatively simple.  Ideally, the ITC 
should put its own house in order by paying greater attention to the statute 
that governs its operation.  If the ITC will not do so—and so far there has 
been no sign that it will—then executive or legislative action is urgently 
                                                      
11 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
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needed to protect the American economy and American consumers from 
overreaching injunctions that end up undermining the creativity they are 
supposed to protect.  Such a result will benefit not only open source 
innovation, but innovation in general. 
 The Article proceeds as follows.  The first two sections outline the 
law and policy of patent injunctions in the federal courts and in the ITC, 
laying out the considerations applicable to any high tech industry.  The 
remaining sections describe the specific benefits and vulnerabilities of open 
source production and suggest some ways in which injunctive practice can 
be made more sensitive to them. 
I. EBAY’S STANDARD FOR PATENT INJUNCTIONS 
 In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,12 the Supreme Court laid 
down the standards for granting permanent injunctions in patent 
infringement actions.  Overruling years of Federal Circuit precedent, the 
court decisively rejected the existing presumption that, once a court has 
found that a patent has been infringed, an injunction should issue unless 
there are “exceptional circumstances.”13 Instead, the court held that 
permanent injunctions in patent law were governed by the same equitable 
four-part test as injunctions in other areas of law. 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
                                                      
12 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
13 True, the courts before eBay had refused to issue injunctions if it would not be in 
“the public interest.”  Yet the reach of that exception, at least as defined by the 
Federal Circuit, was small.  It was generally confined to cases where the injunction 
would limit access to some medical or public health technology, particularly if the 
patentee was not actively practicing the invention.  “If a patentee’s failure to 
practice a patented invention frustrates an important public need for the invention, a 
court need not enjoin infringement of the patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988) 
(courts may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity).  
Accordingly, courts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny 
injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest.  See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. 
Abbott Lab., 4 USPQ2d 1001, 1987 WL 123997 (C.D.Cal.1987) (public interest 
required that injunction not stop supply of medical test kits that the patentee itself 
was not marketing), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446, 7 USPQ2d 1191 (Fed. Cir.1988); Vitamin 
Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 64 USPQ 285 (9th 
Cir.1945) (public interest warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of 
oleomargarine); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 21 USPQ 69 (7th Cir. 
1934) (injunction refused against city operation of sewage disposal plant because of 
public health danger).”  Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48 
(1995). 
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equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.14 
 In a strong concurrence, Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer elaborated on the need for caution in issuing injunctions in a number 
of particular situations: suits by “non-practicing entities;” situations in 
which the technology is complicated, the innovation sequential, and the 
patent itself represents only a small portion of the finished product; and 
suits in areas where patent quality is thought to be low and patent ambit 
vague, such as business method patents. 
[A]n injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant 
fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. . . . 
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product 
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages 
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an 
injunction may not serve the public interest.  In addition injunctive 
relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning number of 
patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and 
legal significance in earlier times.  The potential vagueness and 
suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under 
the four-factor test.15 
This passage is particularly striking because the concerns the Court raises 
are all present in the open source context—and especially when dealing 
with open source software.  There too, we have vague patents of suspect 
validity.  There too we have innovation that potentially “reads on” multiple 
(vague) patents and is thus unusually vulnerable to hold-up.  Of course, to 
some extent all software faces these concerns, as do all telecommunications 
technologies, but this Article will argue there are reasons to believe that 
open source methods have both particular benefits to competition and 
particular vulnerabilities to disruption through injunctions.  It is for this 
reason that the flexible equitable considerations discussed in eBay are 
potentially important for the open source context. 
 In practice, district courts seem to have extracted a number of 
messages from the Supreme Court’s guidance on injunctions in eBay.  
Courts have been particularly skeptical about injunction claims brought 
forward in the absence of direct competition. This skepticism is by no 
means confined to  “non-practicing entities” or to patent trolls.  It extends to 
any case in which the litigants (or their licensees) are not direct competitors: 
“[T]he existence of direct competition generally results in a permanent 
                                                      
14 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
15 Id. at 396–97. 
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injunction.  The converse is also true.  Lack of direct competition generally 
results in the denial of a permanent injunction.”16  A number of explanations 
are traditionally offered for this difference in treatment. 
When competition is present, monetary damages generally do not 
compensate a plaintiff for the value of future business goodwill . . . 
that it receives from increasing market share.  In contrast, when there 
is no competition, the plaintiff does not suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of an injunction because it is not losing any market share.  
Moreover, monetary damages are adequate because those are the only 
compensation that such a plaintiff can obtain; an injunction merely 
serves to increase the settlement value of a monetary damages amount.  
The balance of hardships also weighs in favor of denying injunctive 
relief in the absence of direct competition.  The defendant will clearly 
be harmed by the inability to offer its product or services, but there is 
no corresponding hardship suffered by the patent holder.  Finally, the 
public has at least some interest in having the patented technology 
available.17 
These points have considerable force—particularly in concentrating on the 
effect of injunctions in denying technologies to the public—but, in practice, 
another consideration may weigh at least as heavily.  In the high technology 
and software markets, where there are concerns about both patent quality 
and patent clarity, firms have traditionally protected themselves against suit 
by building large “war chests” of patents and either formally cross-licensing 
them to their competitors or relying on the informal threat of “mutual 
assured destruction” should a lawsuit begin.18  In other words, a large 
participant in such markets can defend itself from the vulnerability posed by 
vague and low quality patents by leveraging the symmetrical vulnerability 
faced by its competitors.  Even in the absence of a formal patent pool, each 
party is likely both infringed upon and infringing, and thus neither will sue. 
 This method of dealing with the problems in the patent system is no 
panacea.  For one thing, it poses troubling barriers to entry.  Only large 
holdings of patents will allow participants to enter patent pools or to 
credibly threaten mutual ruin should legal actions commence.  Thus, small 
                                                      
16 Bernard H. Chao, After Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape 
For Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 553 (2008). 
17 Id. at 553–54. 
18 See, e.g., Brian Kahin, Prospects for Knowledge Policy, in ADVANCING 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 4 (B. Kahin & D. Foray eds., 2006) 
(“A profusion of property interests cannot be managed with due attention, 
understanding, and deliberation on a cost-effective basis, especially when the 
interests are of low or indeterminate value.  We see a number of market-based 
responses to this problem, such as . . . Patent pools . . . Cross-licensing . . . 
Nonassertion agreements . . . [and] ‘Mutually assured destruction.’”). 
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startups are unable to avail themselves of this form of legal flak jacket.  
Nevertheless, for at least some participants in the market, formal patent 
pooling or informal mutual deterrence clearly function to mitigate the 
problems arising from patent thickets and patent hold-up.  However, there is 
one player against which such tactics are clearly useless: the non-practicing 
entity.  Precisely because it is not in the relevant market, it faces no such 
vulnerability.  Thus, by focusing on the presence of competition between 
the parties, the courts are not only ensuring that a technology continues to 
be available to the public.  They are also, wisely, tending to deny permanent 
injunctions to those whose behavior is not otherwise constrained and 
moderated by these important formal and informal safety valves. 
 A significant exception to the de facto requirement of competition 
between the parties is found in the case of Commonwealth Scientific & 
Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology Inc.19  There, the 
court concentrated on the status of the plaintiff as a research organization.  
Because research organizations rarely commercialize innovations 
themselves, instead relying on licensing, the court reasoned that an 
injunction was more appropriate to defend the plaintiff’s interests.  The 
reasoning has some force, but, as Professor Mark Lemley points out,20 the 
courts’ focus should be on conduct, not status. 
[W]e can learn something about the raging debate over who is a patent 
troll and what to do about trolls by looking at university patents.  
Universities are non-practicing entities.  They share some 
characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but 
they are not trolls.  Asking what distinguishes universities from trolls 
can actually help us figure out what concerns us about trolls.  What we 
ought to do is abandon the search for a group of individual companies 
to define as bad actors.  In my view, troll is as troll does.  Universities 
will sometimes be bad actors.  So will non-manufacturing patent 
owners.  So will manufacturing patent owners.  Instead of singling out 
bad actors, we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make 
them possible.21 
 While direct competition has rightfully been an important feature in 
courts’ decisions on whether or not to grant injunctions, scholars agree that 
it has not been, and should not become, the be-all and end-all of the 
analysis. 
                                                      
19 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).  CSIRO has since been vacated and 
remanded on validity grounds, but the predisposition to treat research entities as 
different presumably remains.  
20 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Universities], available at 
http://law.fordham.edu/publications/article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=273.   
21 Id. at 612. 
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[D]irect competition should be an important, but not dispositive 
consideration.  The alternative would violate the Supreme Court’s 
prohibition in eBay on broad categorical rules.  There are still other 
circumstances where no injunction should issue even when the 
plaintiff and defendant are direct competitors—for example, when the 
patent covers a relatively unimportant feature of a product, but the 
costs of a design-around are high.22 
The latter problem—the disproportionate leverage that injunctions give to 
patents that cover a small proportion of a challenged invention—was, of 
course, one of the concerns raised in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
eBay.   
 Justice Kennedy’s argument was echoed with particular force in 
Lemley and Shapiro’s influential article Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking.23  Lemley and Shapiro use both economic modeling and empirical 
research to support the thesis that the threat of injunctions can be used to 
extract royalty payments far in excess of the worth of the patent in issue, 
with accompanying harm to the process of innovation. 
The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force 
the downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be 
very powerful.  These threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, 
especially in cases where the injunction is based on a patent covering 
one small component of a complex, profitable, and popular product.  
Injunction threats often involve a strong element of holdup in the 
common circumstance in which the defendant has already invested 
heavily to design, manufacture, market, and sell the product with the 
allegedly infringing feature. . . . [T]he threat of an injunction can 
enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent 
holder’s true economic contribution.  Such royalty overcharges act as a 
tax on new products incorporating the patented technology, thereby 
impeding rather than promoting innovation.24 
Lemley and Shapiro argue persuasively that an important solution to this 
problem is for the courts to stay injunctions in certain circumstances. 
If the infringing firm claims that it can design around the patent, the 
court should issue a stay of its permanent injunction that is long 
enough to permit the infringing firm to complete the redesign, if there 
is one, in an efficient and timely manner.  The infringing party would, 
of course, be required to pay reasonable royalties to the patent holder 
for any sales made during the period of the stay. With such stays, 
holdup based on the disparity between the relatively large value of the 
                                                      
22 Chao, supra note 16, at 555. 
23 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 8. 
24 Id. at 1992–93. 
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patented product and the relatively small value associated with the 
patented feature is sharply reduced or eliminated.25 
 To sum up, the courts have been relatively consistent in their focus 
on direct competition—a point noted both by analysts who agree with the 
focus and those who disagree with it.  The courts, the FTC, and legal 
scholars have also shown concerns about issuing injunctions when the 
patent covers only a small portion of the challenged technology.  However, 
the third and fourth portions of the eBay factors have received less judicial 
attention.  Those factors are “(3) that, considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.”26  Courts have in some cases adopted definitions of the public 
interest that seemed to hearken back to the CAFC’s old test, rejected by the 
Supreme Court in eBay.  The old test, in practice, confined the narrow 
public interest exception to cases involving public health.27  This 
uncertainty about the breadth of the public interest exception is 
compounded by the fact that the CAFC sometimes seems unsure about 
some of the most fundamental components of eBay.28  At other points, 
however, both the district courts and the Federal Circuit seem to be 
operating with more nuanced definitions of the public interest, ones that 
recognize both the public’s interest in competition and in access to 
technology, and the need for courts to design remedies in order to guard 
                                                      
25 Id. at 2038.  There is reason to believe that courts are actually fashioning such 
remedies.  See e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (approving district court’s 20-month “sunset” delay on its injunctive 
remedy, noting that this would probably allow for redesign.) 
26 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
27 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 
2006).  In granting the permanent injunction, the court claimed the public interest 
would not be affected because neither public health nor any other core public 
interest was concerned. 
28 For example, in the federal courts after eBay, do we still have the old rule that, 
once there is a finding of patent infringement, a presumption of irreparable harm 
automatically follows?  To many, this rule seemed to be one of the central points of 
law that eBay rejected.  But when the CAFC was given the opportunity to make that 
clear, it chose to sidestep it in a remarkably noncommittal fashion.  “Amado argues 
that the district court ‘improperly concluded that eBay eliminated the presumption 
of irreparable harm that follows a judgment of validity and infringement.’  We find 
it unnecessary to reach this argument, however, because regardless of whether there 
remains a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm following eBay, the district 
court was within its discretion to find an absence of irreparable harm based on the 
evidence presented at trial.”  Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 2008).  Even more troublingly, as the next section will outline, the CAFC 
has also held that the ITC is exempt from eBay’s requirements altogether. 
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against the kind of “hold-up” that Lemley and Shapiro warn against.  
Consider this passage from the Broadcom case: 
The district court found that although it is generally in the public 
interest to uphold patent rights, “an immediate permanent injunction 
would adversely affect the public” with respect to the ’010 patent, and 
that “an immediate permanent injunction would adversely affect 
network carriers and handset manufacturers that currently employ 
chips which infringe the ’317 Patent in their products.”  However, the 
district court held that the aforementioned sunset provisions “balance[] 
the policy of protecting the patentee’s rights against the desirability of 
avoiding immediate market disruptions.”  We agree that the sunset 
provisions mitigate the harm to the public and that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy that protects 
Broadcom’s rights while allowing Qualcomm time to develop non-
infringing substitutes.29 
 This Article argues that this type of analysis is appropriate in 
guiding the future of patent injunctions, particularly when animated by the 
concerns raised by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay and in the 
writings of legal scholars such as Professors Lemley and Shapiro.  This 
strand of interpretation of the eBay test focuses on the type of competition 
involved, the public’s interest in access to technology, and the need for 
flexible remedies that both protect patent holders and safeguard competition 
and technological access.  Ironically, those concerns are specifically written 
into the statute that governs another injunction-granting body—the ITC.  
Unfortunately, they appear to have been ignored. 
II. INJUNCTIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
 In the 2010 case of Spansion v. ITC,30 the CAFC held that the ITC 
was not bound by the eBay factors in granting injunctions.31  The court 
reasoned that, being authorized by a different statute, the ITC was not 
subject to the general equitable limitations outlined in eBay.  That 
conclusion is a deeply problematic one, both on the narrowest doctrinal 
grounds and as a matter of policy. 
 As a doctrinal matter, even if Congress in the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act eliminated the requirement of proving irreparable 
injury in the trade context, that is a logically separate question from the 
issue of whether the equitable eBay factors must still be satisfied before 
granting an injunction.  The CAFC points to the fact that the statute is 
                                                      
29 Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 704 (citations omitted). 
30 629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
31 Technically, the ITC’s remedy is a combination of an exclusion order and a cease 
and desist order.  The result is functionally identical to an injunction.   
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different and concludes that Congress intended to displace the equitable 
factors outlined in eBay.  But this conclusion is far from certain.  If the 
attempt was to displace equitable considerations, why include most of them 
in the text of § 1337?  And even if equitable factors appear in the patent 
statute, the CAFC was not actually applying them—the very point stressed 
in eBay. 
 Interestingly, when one looks at the copyright context, one finds the 
courts have concluded that the eBay factors do govern the granting of 
injunctions, even preliminary injunctions32—a holding that has transformed 
copyright jurisprudence.  Copyright is, like the ITC, governed by a different 
statutory scheme.  Yet the Federal Appeals courts have made it clear that, in 
the future, copyright injunctions can only be granted after an eBay-type 
review including a focus on the public interest.  In fact, the Second Circuit 
was even more expansive, saying, “eBay strongly indicates that the 
traditional principles of equity it employed are the presumptive standard for 
injunctions in any context.”33  Thus we have the irony that in copyright and, 
according to the Second Circuit, far beyond copyright, eBay governs.  Yet 
in ITC patent cases its test does not apply, though patent law was the very 
field on which eBay concentrated. 
 More importantly, if one looks at the text of the section at issue, one 
finds—repeated three times in the three relevant remedy provisions—a set 
of reasons for excluding injunctions that clearly invoke some of the 
concerns the equitable factors reaffirmed in eBay are designed to address.  
For example, in the exclusion section, one finds the following limitations: 
(d) Exclusion of articles from entry  
(1) If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under 
this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that 
the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision 
of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, 
after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health 
and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the 
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, 
and United States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be 
excluded from entry.34 
                                                      
32 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold today that 
eBay applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for 
alleged copyright infringement.  First, nothing in the text or the logic of eBay 
suggests that its rule is limited to patent cases.  On the contrary, eBay strongly 
indicates that the traditional principles of equity it employed are the presumptive 
standard for injunctions in any context.”) (emphasis added). 
33 Id. (emphasis added). 
34 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d)–(f) (2006). 
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 Identical exceptions are to be found in the sections giving the 
Commission power to offer preliminary relief35 and cease-and-desist 
orders.36  Thus, all parts of the Commission’s injunctive powers are clearly 
subject to statutory exceptions that deal with the same cluster of public 
interest issues presented by eBay, including competitive conditions 
generally, specific competition in producing similar or directly competitive 
articles, and effect on consumers.  In practice, the Commission has ignored 
these exceptions.  Though it would have been a very small stretch for the 
Federal Circuit to conclude that Congress was in fact amplifying the 
traditional equitable requirements for injunctions, and thus that eBay did 
apply, it chose not to do so. 
 It is worth noting that, on paper, this set of rules for granting 
injunctions is actually more restrictive than the rules under which the CAFC 
had been granting injunctions before eBay.  The CAFC’s old test did refer 
to a narrow public interest concern, largely confined to the public health 
factors noted in the first part of § 1337.  But it did not consider the 
remaining three limiting factors: general competitive conditions in the U.S. 
economy, production of similar or directly competitive articles in the U.S., 
and the effect of injunctions on consumers.  Sadly, the ITC has never found 
that any of these factors precluded issuing an injunction.  For all intents and 
purposes, its jurisprudence has read the exceptions out of the statute. 
 As a policy matter, the Spansion decision is even more unfortunate.  
The CAFC was created in 1982 to serve the goal of uniformity in patent 
law—to end the great differences between the Circuits and establish a single 
law of patent in the United States.  Yet the Spansion decision completely 
undermines that uniformity.  It effectively creates two systems of patents in 
the United States.37  In the federal courts, the eBay standard rules and, as a 
result, at least some of the injunctive dangers mentioned earlier are 
mitigated.  Among those dangers are “hold-up,” royalty stacking, the 
uncertainty caused by vague patents of uncertain validity, and the chill put 
on strongly sequential innovation that often reads on thousands of patents.  
Because the courts are required to consider such issues as the balance of 
hardships and the public interest, and because they focus on such issues as 
direct competition between the parties and willingness to license, 
injunctions are no longer automatic.  In the ITC, by contrast, a completely 
different law of injunctions reigns. One would have thought the CAFC, 
created in order to bring order and consistency to the world of patents, 
                                                      
35 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e). 
36 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f). 
37 For a description of other inconsistencies between the ITC and the federal courts, 
see generally Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation 
of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529 (2009). 
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might have paused at the thought of ratifying the very different standard 
governing injunctions at the ITC, but it did not. 
 For cases in which infringement was found, empirical studies show 
the ITC issued injunctions at an astonishing rate of 96–100%.38  Given that 
patent holders are rational, it comes as no surprise that the ITC has recently 
experienced a surge of activity.  Patent holders forum-shop by picking a 
venue that, empirical studies show, is already biased towards plaintiffs, 
even without considering the differences in standards for an injunction. 
The ITC found a violation in 23% of completed cases (109 of 467).  
When settlements and the finding of a violation are categorized as 
favorable outcomes for the complainant, the complainant received a 
favorable outcome in roughly 69% of patent cases brought before the 
ITC. . . . We compared the overall win rate of complainants at the ITC 
with the overall win rate of plaintiffs at district courts.  While we 
found that the overall rate at which the ITC finds infringement is 23%, 
prior research shows that district courts found infringement in only 
about 6% of all patent cases.  This simple difference in win rates 
supports the inference that the ITC is biased in favor of complainants 
relative to the district courts.39 
 The CAFC is also bound in its interpretation of patent law by the 
Constitution, and in particular by the constitutional grant of power under 
which Congress makes laws regarding patents: Article 1, section 8, clause 8.  
In the Supreme Court’s words, 
the federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision 
which authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Discoveries.”  Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The clause is both a 
grant of power and a limitation. . . . The Congress in the exercise of 
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the 
stated constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly 
without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained 
thereby. . . . Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the 
sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system 
which by constitutional command must “promote the Progress of . . . 
                                                      
38 Hahn and Singer found that the ITC issued injunctions in 96% of cases where 
infringement was found.  Hahn & Singer, supra note 9, at 484. Colleen Chien found 
the ITC issued an injunction to a prevailing patentee in 100% of cases.  Colleen 
Chien, Patently Protectionist?: An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the 
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008). 
39 Hahn & Singer, supra note 9, at 474–76. 
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useful Arts.”  This is the standard expressed in the Constitution, and it 
may not be ignored.40 
 By ratifying the ITC’s separate standard for injunctions when the 
Supreme Court has introduced substantial limitations on those injunctions 
elsewhere, the CAFC has effectively “enlarged the patent monopoly,” 
giving more power to patent holders.  The effect of this action is magnified 
given the ITC’s empirically demonstrated pro-plaintiff bias.  Yet the CAFC 
has done so without any consideration of whether this particular 
interpretation of the law “promotes the progress,” a point that is given 
especial force by the resulting lack of harmony in the patent system; hardly 
the interpretive result one would want if one was seeking to promote 
innovation. 
 What should be done to rectify these problems?  The first solution 
is obvious.  The ITC needs to start applying its own authorizing statute.  As 
discussed earlier in this Article, the Supreme Court, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and legal and empirical scholars have all warned against the 
distortions that the automatic granting of injunctions can impose on the 
innovative and competitive process.  The ITC’s deliberations, however, 
appear untouched by these issues, which is remarkable because the very 
words describing those concerns appear in § 1337 and attention to them 
ought to be prompted by the Constitution’s intellectual property clause. 
 Because the ITC has no power to levy money damages, its power is 
said to be injunction or nothing—one reason scholars have given for the 
96–100% win rate.  Yet this explanation is simply inaccurate.  Under 
current law, there are several things the ITC could clearly do.  For example: 
• The ITC has the power to stay exclusion and cease-
and-desist orders pending a redesign.  The staying of 
an order means that consumers are not denied access 
to technology and that competition in the specific 
market is not undermined because of a single count of 
infringement that represents a tiny fraction of the 
innovation in a particular product. The latter point is 
an issue of particular concern to open source 
innovation networks.  It is also applicable more 
generally to all companies working in high technology 
areas that feature complex innovations on which 
thousands of patents can “read.”  Were the ITC to 
adopt a wider practice of staying orders, it would be 
following exactly the logic of the CAFC’s 
                                                      
40 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
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endorsement of “sunset,” or delayed, injunctions in 
Broadcom v. Qualcomm.41 
• The ITC also has the power, indeed the responsibility, 
to refuse to issue orders altogether if the effects on 
competition or the consumer would be negative.  The 
patent holder is hardly left without remedy by such an 
action because, in most cases, it would have access to 
the federal courts. 
 If the ITC continues to ignore the limitations in § 1337, then 
administrative or legislative action will be necessary.  One simply cannot 
have a system that automatically issues injunctions without considering the 
public interest in a world that contains patent trolls, vague patents of 
uncertain validity, and sequential innovation that potentially reads on 
thousands of patents. 
III. THE BENEFITS AND VULNERABILITIES OF OPEN SOURCE 
 This Article focuses on open innovation and, in particular, on open 
source methods of technological development, in which a wide network of 
developers participate in building on a shared technological base that is 
freely available to all.  Classic examples include the operating system 
Linux, the Firefox browser, the Apache web server, and the Android 
operating system for mobile devices.  Free and open source software powers 
everything from phones and search engines to ATMs and TiVo digital video 
recorders; the companies that develop these products make up a large and 
innovative industry sector that supports millions of jobs.  A recent study by 
Dr. Roya Ghafele and Benjamin Gibert estimated there were 1.2 million 
open source-related software development jobs in the United States alone, 
and that estimate ignores the millions of other jobs that depend on open 
source applications.42  But this method of development is not confined to 
software: open source or open innovation methods are also found in areas 
ranging from synthetic biology to the development of artificial limbs.  As 
the FTC recently pointed out,43 open innovation and open source methods 
offer compelling advantages in fostering both competition and rapid 
technological development. 
A. Market Share 
 Open source applications already have a substantial market share in 
multiple areas.  For example, the most important open source operating 
                                                      
41 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 704 (2008). 
42 See generally ROYA GHAFELE & BENJAMIN GIBERT, EFFICIENCY THROUGH 
OPENNESS: THE ECONOMIC VALUE PROPOSITION OF OPEN SOURCE (2011). 
43 EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 4. 
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system for phones is Android, initially produced by Google, and made 
available to any phone company or tablet manufacturer.  Gartner, the 
leading analyst in the field, estimates that Android’s share of the market for 
smartphone and mobile device operating systems was 43.4% in the second 
quarter of 2011, with Apple’s market share at 18.2%.44 
Operating 
System 
2Q11 Units 2Q11 Market 
Share (%) 
2Q10 Units 2Q10 Market 
Share (%) 
Android 46,775.9 43.4 10,652.7 17.2 
Symbian 23,853.2 22.1 25,386.8 40.9 
iOS 19,628.8 18.2 8,743.0 14.1 
Research In 
Motion 
12,652.3 11.7 11,628.8 18.7 
Bada 2,055.8 1.9 577.0 0.9 
Microsoft 1,723.8 1.6 3,058.8 4.9 
Others 1,050.6 1.0 2,010.9 3.2 
Total 107,740.4 100.0 62,058.1 100.0 
 
 Whereas only the iPhone and iPad run iOS, Android is used by 
multiple phone manufacturers, all of whom are free to customize the 
software to their particular requirements.  This is a point to which I will 
return in a moment.  In addition, the Symbian operating system, which was 
once open source, operates on a hybrid “shared source” model.45  Symbian 
accounts for an additional 22.1% of the market for operating systems. 
 In the world of webserver software, the software that actually runs 
the web, the role of open source is just as pronounced.  The leading study of 
webserver software, run by Netcraft,46 estimated that the open source server 
software Apache was running on 65% of the web’s leading sites.  nginx, 
another type of open source server software, accounted for an additional 
8%. 
 
 
 
                                                      
44 Gartner Says Sales of Mobile Devices in Second Quarter of 2011 Grew 16.5 
Percent Year-on-Year, GARTNER (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.gartner.com/it/  
page.jsp?id=1764714.  
45 Symbian Foundation Has Transitioned to a Licensing Body, SYMBIAN, 
http://licensing.symbian.org/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
46 December 2011 Web Server Survey, NETCRAFT (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2011/12/09/december-2011-web-server-survey 
.html.  
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Developer # of sites 12/11  Percent of Market 
Apache 362,267,922 65.22% 
Microsoft 82,521,809 14.86% 
nginx 49,143,289 8.85% 
Google 18,464,148 3.32% 
 
 
Netcraft Study:  Market Share for Top Servers Across All Domains: August 1995– 
December 201147 
 The prevalence of open source at the server level is in dramatic 
contrast to the world of desktop operating systems, where estimates put 
Microsoft at about 92%, Mac OS at about 6%, and the free/open source 
operating system Linux at about 2%.48  This pattern is changing, however, 
as mobile devices start to replace many desktop functions.  And, as stressed 
                                                      
47 Id. 
48 Desktop Operating System Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE (Jan. 2012), 
http://marketshare.hitslink.com/operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=8&qp 
customd=0.  Even in this market, though, economists argue that the availability of 
an open source alternative has been important.  “We argue that open source and 
free software licensing has been one of the most important factors of change in the 
microcomputer operating system markets in the recent years.  We have seen new 
entrants in the relatively closed markets as well as renewed business models by 
incumbents.  However, there has been no single open source strategy; all market 
players have adopted open source into their operating system strategy in one form 
or other.”  Mikko Valimaki & Ville Oksanen, The Impact of Free And Open Source 
Licensing On Operating System Software Markets, 22 J. TELEMATICS & 
INFORMATICS 97, 97 (2005).   
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before, there are literally hundreds of other examples of both free and open 
source software, and of open source innovation more generally. 
B. Policy Concerns 
 Clearly open source development is economically significant.  But 
why should policy makers care about it?  This Article will focus on three 
features of open source development that are important for innovation 
policy: 
• The beneficial competitive effect on markets otherwise 
reliant on proprietary systems, particularly when 
network effects are involved. 
• The openness, transparency, and non-exclusivity of the 
innovation process. 
• The vulnerabilities of any open innovation system that 
relies on a heterogeneous network of developers. 
C. Open Source and Network Effects 
 High technology markets are frequently characterized by the 
existence of network effects.49  Markets tend to “tip” toward a single 
standard—whether a single operating system or a single format for high 
quality DVDs.  The standard assumptions of economics posit declining 
returns to scale, but markets characterized by network effects exhibit the 
opposite characteristic.  There are increasing returns to scale and the value 
of one consumer’s purchased goods can be affected positively or negatively 
by other consumer choices.  If I am buying apples and you are buying pears, 
the choices have very little effect on each other.  Shelf space for pears may 
decrease if there is more demand for apples, but the effect is weak; 
purchasing decisions are largely independent.  However, if I am buying a 
HD DVD video player when you, and many others, are buying Blu-Ray 
DVD players, the value of my player will be affected by your choices.  If 
enough people pick the alternative format, the number of titles offered in 
HD DVD will dwindle and the format will be discontinued, as in fact it was.  
Conversely, if I am an early adopter of Microsoft Word, as that word 
processing software becomes the dominant one on the market, the value of 
my purchase increases.  I can exchange documents with more people, 
                                                      
49 For some classic accounts of network effects and their relevance to competition 
and innovation policy, see generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network 
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); 
Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 20 J. 
Pub. Econ. 231 (1983); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). 
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peddle my skills in Word to more employers, and otherwise consume all the 
benefits of compatibility.  It is precisely because of these benefits that 
markets characterized by network effects tend to “tip” sharply towards the 
dominant standard.  As a consumer, I do not wish to be the last person 
trapped in Betamax, or WordPerfect, or HD DVD.  Unlike markets that can 
easily sustain competitive equilibria with multiple competing products and 
firms, network effects markets tend to be winner-take-all. 
 It is here that the problems for competition policy emerge.  The first 
problem is the standard price effect of monopoly.  If the dominant standard 
is proprietary, the owner can extract supracompetitive rents while the 
coordination costs of switching to a new standard or technology lock users 
in.  The second effect, however, is dynamic, not passive—it is an effect on 
future innovation.  The “lock in” of network effects can tie consumers to an 
inferior old technology precisely because of those coordination costs of 
switching.  Consider word processing.  If I develop a superior product to 
Microsoft Word—faster, cleaner, and with more features that consumers 
want—I face a problem not faced by the person who develops a better 
mousetrap or a more fuel-efficient car.  Millions of users have already 
learned Word.  They have thousands of documents saved in Word.  They 
have invested a considerable amount of time mastering Word’s features.  
Most importantly, even if one of them wishes to switch format, she faces 
coordination costs with all of the other Word users.  No one wishes to be 
the sole adopter of a new technology, even if superior, if the rest of the 
public is still using the old technology and one is thus locked out of the 
network.  How can users all decide to switch together? 
 Thus, to sum up, the combination of network effects and proprietary 
software means that consumers may bear the costs, in the form of higher 
prices and reduced innovation.  But when the technology is open source, no 
such hold-up is possible.  Multiple developers can offer competing versions, 
with the competition simultaneously bringing down prices and offering 
greater choice and customization.  The monopolist cannot capture the 
benefits of the golden handcuffs of network effects, because there can be no 
monopolist; competitors have a legally guaranteed right of access to copy 
and modify the software that has become the market standard. 
 Most importantly, in markets in which both proprietary and open 
source products compete, the existence of the open source alternative 
provides a valuable check even on potential monopoly power, as well as a 
continued prod to innovation by all of the companies involved, whether 
open source or proprietary.  Think of the vibrant and competitive 
smartphone and tablet market in which, as the Gartner study quoted earlier 
shows, there are striking increases of market share for open source 
operating systems and continued competition between open source and 
proprietary operating systems.  Owners of iPhones, Blackberries, and 
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Android phones have benefitted both in pricing and in the rapid 
development of new features because of the competition involved—a 
competition not only between types of phones, but between different models 
of innovation.  The company that installs Android on its handset is free to 
customize, to modify, and to experiment with new features.  Consumers can 
choose among those phones, sending market signals back about which 
“flavor” of Android phone is preferable.  The source code for the 
underlying operating system is open to all, exposing both problems and 
opportunities to potential developers, and dramatically easing the task of 
creating complementary “apps” that use the operating system’s features.  
Users have a rich ecosystem of devices and features, and a richer system of 
applications.  This wealth of options in turn raises the competitive bar for 
the proprietary alternatives.  This spur to competitiveness, yielding lower 
prices and accelerated innovation, clearly benefits consumers and the public 
interest.50 
D. The Benefits of Open Innovation 
 In a seminal article about free and open source software, Yochai 
Benkler explains the informational efficiency advantages possessed by—to 
use his terms—decentralized, commons-based peer production.51  The 
terminology is complex, but the idea at the heart of Benkler’s argument is a 
simple one.  Open source production is transparent.  Unlike the 
conventional proprietary software company producing code that is 
enigmatic to the outside world (because the source code is concealed), 
through processes that themselves are hidden behind the walls of the firm, 
the open source production process occurs in an open network.  Multiple 
players can see the full details of the production process, can grasp the 
internal details of the code being produced, and can even judge who would 
be the best person or team suited for a job.  That transparency brings twin 
                                                      
50 This point has been born out in the empirical economics literature.  “This paper 
analyzes a software market consisting of a freely available open source software 
(OSS), the commercial version of this OSS (OSS-SS), and the competing 
commercial proprietary software (PS).  We find that in software markets 
characterized by low direct network benefits, the PS vendor is better off in the 
presence of competition from OSS-SS.  Furthermore, the OSS-SS vendor in these 
markets is better off by having lower usability than PS.  Therefore, the PS vendor 
has little incentive to improve the usability of their software in these markets.  On 
the other hand, in software markets characterized by high network benefits, a PS 
vendor is threatened by the presence of OSS-SS and can survive only if the PS is 
more usable than the competing OSS-SS.”  Ravi Sen, A Strategic Analysis of 
Competition Between Open Source and Proprietary Software, 24 J. MGMT INFO. 
SYS. 233, 233 (2007). 
51 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369 (2002). 
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informational advantages in its wake—advantages that in certain market 
contexts can actually surpass the efficiency of vertically integrated firms, or 
impersonal markets operating through contract-based solutions. 
[T]his mode of production is better than firms and markets for two 
reasons.  First, it is better at identifying and assigning human capital to 
information and cultural production processes.  In this regard, peer-
production has an advantage in what I call “information opportunity 
cost.”  That is, it loses less information about who the best person for a 
given job might be than do either of the other two organizational 
modes.  Second, there are substantial increasing returns to allow very 
larger clusters of potential contributors to interact with very large 
clusters of information resources in search of new projects and 
collaboration enterprises.  Removing property and contract as the 
organizing principles of collaboration substantially reduces transaction 
costs involved in allowing these large clusters of potential contributors 
to review and select which resources to work on, for which projects, 
and with which collaborators.  This results in allocation gains, that 
increase more than proportionately with the increase in the number of 
individuals and resources that are part of the system.52 
Or, to quote Eric Raymond: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are 
shallow.”53  Benkler’s point is echoed by economist James Bessen, who, in 
his article Open Source Software: The Free Provision of Complex Public 
Goods,54 develops a model to show the ways in which open source software 
will offer greater customizing ability—one that surpasses the ability of ex 
ante contracts to provide customized software in the proprietary context. 
 The point is a more general one.  By allowing a wide range of 
participants, small and large, to share in the process of innovation on a layer 
of open technology, society gets the benefit of diverse approaches to the 
same technological puzzles.  Open source offers a type of technological 
“species diversity” in contrast to the proprietary monocultures. 
E. The Vulnerabilities of Open Source 
 But if open source innovation has great social benefits in fostering 
competition and innovation, it also has particular vulnerabilities.  First, 
precisely because open source development takes place in a network and 
                                                      
52 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm – 
Abstract, BENKLER, http://www.benkler.org/CoasesPenguin.html (last visited Mar. 
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allows both small and large players to participate and to build on a common 
technology, it is particularly susceptible to attack and disruption.  A 
proprietary monopolist fully internalizes both the costs and benefits of 
policing its technology and its intellectual property.  Think of a proprietary 
software company faced by the threat of an injunction—particularly one 
that might be granted under the plaintiff-favorable standards of the ITC.  
Faced with an offer to license the disputed technology, the proprietary 
monopolist can judge perfectly whether it is in its interest to challenge the 
patent or to pay the licensing fee—even if it believes the patent to be 
invalid.  It will capture all the gains of a patent challenge if successful.  It 
will bear all the costs of an injunction or licensing fee if not. 
 Members of an open innovation network, however, are in a 
different situation.  Individual members can be “picked off,” forced to 
abandon promising lines of technological development, or to pay ruinous 
stacked royalties because the costs of litigation are too burdensome for any 
one member of the network to bear.  Why should this one node in the 
network take on the heavy financial responsibility of challenging the patent, 
when the gains—if it wins—will be captured by its free-riding fellow 
network members?  In a situation like this one, patent challenges start to 
exhibit the economic characteristics of public goods—nonrivalrousness and 
nonexcludability.  Even if it would be collectively in the interest of an open 
innovation network to litigate the patent aggressively, it may not be in the 
individual interest of any of its participants.  In such a market, we will get 
an inefficiently low level of patent challenges. 
 It is in situations like this one that the threat of injunctions is 
particularly worrisome.  In fast-moving technology markets, the dead stop 
forced by an injunction can be enough to doom a product.  An entire 
network of innovation could be shut down by an injunction obtained against 
a single small participant that lacks the resources necessary to challenge the 
patent or defend against the injunction. 
 Second, most of these markets are characterized by strongly 
cumulative innovation.  A finished product may “read on” literally 
thousands of potential patents.  In these markets, as Justice Kennedy noted 
in eBay, there are considerable concerns with low patent quality and with 
the vagueness of the patents themselves.55  Even the most scrupulous 
respecter of intellectual property can be subject to hold- up by a company 
claiming its patent has been infringed.  To quote the FTC: 
Under some circumstances, however, the threat of an injunction can 
lead an infringer to pay higher royalties than the patentee could have 
obtained in a competitive technology market. At the time a 
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manufacturer faces an infringement allegation, switching to an 
alternative technology may be very expensive if it has sunk costs in 
production using the patented technology.  That may be true even if 
choosing the alternative earlier would have entailed little additional 
cost.  If so, the patentee can use the threat of an injunction to obtain 
royalties covering not only the market value of the patented invention, 
but also a portion of the costs that the infringer would incur if it were 
enjoined and had to switch.  This higher royalty based on switching 
costs is called the “hold-up” value of the patent.  Patent hold-up can 
overcompensate patentees, raise prices to consumers who lose the 
benefits of competition among technologies, and deter innovation by 
manufacturers facing the risk of hold-up.56 
 Large firms protect themselves from the vulnerability inherent in 
this situation by purchasing huge war chests of patents, not for their 
inherent value but to threaten “mutual assured destruction” should their 
large competitors start a patent war.57  But an open innovation or open 
source network is at best imperfectly protected by such tactics, and remains 
vulnerable in any event to hold-up by “non-practicing entities”—patent 
trolls who can use the threat of an injunction to extract large rents without 
being subject to attack in return because they never actually make anything.  
These dangers are particularly acute when, as is often the case in the high 
technology area: (1) the patent in dispute represents a tiny proportion of the 
innovation in a finished product,  (2) the patents in the area are of uncertain 
scope and doubtful validity, and (3) the patent claim comes to light after the 
product has been designed and the defendant faces an injunction that will 
deny it time to redesign unless it can—as the FTC points out—pay the 
“hold-up” cost.  In the words of Lemley and Shapiro, 
[t]he threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force 
the downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be 
very powerful.  These threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, 
especially in cases where the injunction is based on a patent covering 
one small component of a complex, profitable, and popular product.58 
 The law of patents and patent injunctions did not originate in an 
open source world.  The law’s assumptions did not contemplate 
decentralized networks of innovation on top of a shared technological layer, 
open to all.  The law did not contemplate either the benefits or the 
vulnerabilities of such a system.  Nor did the law of patents and patent 
injunctions originate in a world where inventions were as intangible, and 
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their subject matter as slippery, as the world of software patents, or the 
confused world of method patents after Bilski.59  The idea of a single device 
“reading on” hundreds or even thousands of patents would have been mind-
boggling to Jefferson, and the vagueness of those patents would surely have 
been horrifying.60 
 Yet it would be equally mistaken to think the law of patents lacks 
tools with which to react to these changed circumstances.  Indeed, the whole 
impetus of eBay was to restore equitable consideration in the place of the 
CAFC’s mistaken hard-and-fast presumptions.  The point of equitable 
consideration in injunction deliberations is that it allows the law to be 
sensitive to new contexts.  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, joined 
by three other members of the Court, clearly has in mind many of the 
problems that beset open source innovation. 
[A]n injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant 
fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. . . . 
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product 
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages 
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an 
injunction may not serve the public interest.  In addition injunctive 
relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning number of 
patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and 
legal significance in earlier times.  The potential vagueness and 
suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under 
the four-factor test.61 
In the next section, this Article considers some of the potential ways in 
which patent law can strike the appropriate balance—protecting patent 
holders and yet not chilling innovation, technological access, and 
competition.  The first two clusters of these solutions are applicable to any 
type of high technology industry, while the third cluster uses the flexibility 
in the eBay factors to make it specifically responsive to the concerns of 
open source innovation. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INJUNCTION LAW AND POLICY 
 A patent is a legal right to exclude.  Injunctions are an important 
method to protect that legal right.  Plaintiffs should have injunctive relief 
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available as a remedy if a clear, high-quality patent is definitely being 
violated, if the plaintiff truly is being irreparably harmed by it, if the 
balance of hardships favors the plaintiff, and if there are no public interest 
factors that militate against an injunction.  
 The reason this issue is currently so heated is that each one of those 
requirements is frequently missing in high technology markets.  The patents 
frequently are of low quality and vague.  (This is particularly true in the 
software context.)  The plaintiff’s case for irreparable harm is frequently 
weak—unless it is simply assumed, as by the ITC.  Damages will often be 
an adequate remedy, most obviously in the case of a “non-practicing entity” 
that is only seeking to license, not to make, the patented innovation in any 
event.  The balance of hardships is frequently much more complex, 
particularly in the case of a patent that represents a small amount of the 
innovation in some complicated product.  The hardship imposed on 
defendants is magnified if the defendant could easily have designed around 
the patent at the beginning of the process and is now being subject to “hold-
up” when that option is unavailable.  Finally, the public interest is often a 
complex issue.  If the public is being denied access to the technology 
altogether during the injunction, or if a type of benign competition is being 
removed from the market for a violation of a patent covering a small portion 
of a complex product, the public interest will frequently lean strongly 
against an injunction. 
A. Suggested General Reforms: Federal Courts 
1. Presumptively confining injunctions to cases in which there is direct 
competition. 
 As detailed earlier, district courts have applied a de facto 
presumption against injunctions in cases that do not involve direct 
competition.  They have been particularly reluctant to grant injunctions to 
non-practicing entities.  Both of these patterns seem appropriate and should 
continue.  Under the logic of eBay, this denial of injunctions should not be a 
formal rule.  Rather, when applying the eBay factors, courts will correctly 
tend to conclude in most cases that do not involve direct competition that no 
injunction is needed and that a damage remedy is sufficient.  In the case of a 
non-practicing entity, because it is seeking licensing revenue rather than 
attempting to practice the technology itself, and because the alternative 
might deny the technology to the public, injunctive relief seems particularly 
inappropriate.  A more searching analysis may be necessary in the case of 
patent suits brought by research organizations, but Professor Lemley’s 
No. 1] OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION 58 
caution that universities and other research entities can act as trolls needs to 
be taken into account.62 
2. If injunctions are granted, liberal use of “stays” and sunset provisions in 
order to allow for redesign, with payment of appropriate damages if 
necessary. 
 One of the biggest dangers in the contemporary world of high 
technology patents is that of “hold-up,” as the FTC’s recent report on the 
patent system points out.63  Both courts and scholars have observed that this 
problem can be mitigated by staying injunctions, or entering “sunset 
provisions” pending redesign.  In the words of the CAFC in Broadcom, 
the district court held that the aforementioned sunset provisions 
“balance[] the policy of protecting the patentee’s rights against the 
desirability of avoiding immediate market disruptions.”  We agree that 
the sunset provisions mitigate the harm to the public and that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy that 
protects Broadcom’s rights while allowing Qualcomm time to develop 
non-infringing substitutes.64 
In their important article on royalty-stacking and hold-up, Lemley and 
Shapiro amplify this argument. 
If the infringing firm claims that it can design around the patent, the 
court should issue a stay of its permanent injunction that is long 
enough to permit the infringing firm to complete the redesign, if there 
is one, in an efficient and timely manner.  The infringing party would, 
of course, be required to pay reasonable royalties to the patent holder 
for any sales made during the period of the stay.  With such stays, 
holdup based on the disparity between the relatively large value of the 
patented product and the relatively small value associated with the 
patented feature is sharply reduced or eliminated.65 
3. Courts should give hard look review to injunction claims when the patent 
covers only a small fraction of the allegedly infringing product. If an 
injunction is granted, they should favor stays pending redesign. 
 When the fraction of the allegedly infringing product affected by 
the patent is small, the public interest and balance of hardships factors both 
tilt in favor of the defendant.66  First, the public has an interest in access to 
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technology.  It will generally be hard to justify denying public access to an 
entire complex technology because of an infringement that affects a very 
small portion of it.  Second, the balance of hardships factor seems to favor 
the defendant here, with the exception of a situation in which there is strong 
proof of deliberate copying.  This is true both because of the imbalance 
between the extent of the technology enjoined and the extent of the 
technology infringed, and also because, with complex sequential 
innovation, we are more likely to find the kinds of dysfunctions in the 
patent system described in the eBay concurrence.  These dysfunctions will 
be particularly evident in areas where patents are vague and of dubious 
validity; the complexity of the product acts as a multiplier effect on the 
difficulty potential defendants face in “clearing” their products of any 
possible infringement ex ante. 
B. Suggested General Reforms: International Trade Commission 
 The ITC poses a genuine problem in reforming the patent injunction 
process in the United States.  At the moment, the ITC grants injunctions in 
nearly all cases—the current statistic is 96%.  The CAFC ruled in Spansion 
v. ITC67 that the ITC is not subject to the equitable limitations in eBay, a 
decision criticized in Part II of this Article.68  The result has been genuine 
damage to the attempt to harmonize the U.S. patent system.  This result is 
even more unfortunate given that scholars have argued there is empirical 
evidence the ITC is biased in favor of plaintiffs,69 and that it is biased in 
favor of domestic industries.70  In particular, the ITC has given scant 
attention to the limitations in its own authorizing statute, limitations which 
strongly echo the themes of eBay.  Section 1337 does not tell the ITC to 
grant an injunction in every case in which infringement is found.  It tells it 
to do so “unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the 
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States 
economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the 
United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles 
should not be excluded.”71 
1. The ITC should apply the limitations in its own statute. 
 At present, judging by both its decisions and its rate of granting 
injunctions, the ITC’s deliberations have been almost completely unaffected 
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by the factors listed above—in particular, by concern for general 
competitive conditions in the U.S. economy, the production of like or 
directly competitive articles in the U.S., or effects on U.S. consumers.  A 
moment’s thought allows one to recognize that these factors address both 
the concerns at the heart of eBay, and the questions raised by the FTC, 
scholars, and the Supreme Court about hold-up, royalty stacking, and the 
continuing availability of technology.  The ITC could solve many of its 
current problems merely by taking seriously the limitations on its 
injunction-granting power, and it should be pressed to do so. In some cases, 
this will mean denying injunctions altogether and leaving the plaintiff to 
pursue damage remedies in the federal courts. 
2. When it does issue injunctions, the ITC should consider granting stays 
pending redesign. 
 The logic of Broadcom or of Lemley and Shapiro’s article applies 
equally to the ITC.  Stays balance the patent holder’s interest in legal 
protection of exclusivity and the interests of the public in having access to 
technology.  They also mitigate against the considerable danger of “hold-
up,” a danger that appears to concern everyone but the ITC. 
 Unfortunately, the ITC has so far shown no interest in hewing more 
closely to its own statute, being attentive to the larger debate about optimal 
patent remedies, or heeding the concerns expressed in eBay, even if, as a 
formal doctrinal matter, it remains unconstrained by that opinion.  What 
other options are there? 
3. Give district courts exclusive control over patent law claims for which 
they have jurisdiction. 
 Hahn and Singer argue that, in order to cut down on the “Type II” 
errors—that is, false positives; in this case the granting of injunctions when 
they should not be granted—the ITC should be partially stripped of its 
jurisdiction. Their argument is as follows: 
One way to minimize the social costs from Type II errors is to give 
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over any patent law claim for 
which they have jurisdiction over the parties.  Under this approach, the 
ITC would only adjudicate those patent cases for which the accused 
infringer is not subject to the district court’s jurisdiction or cannot be 
identified.  As cases are adjudicated in district courts, there are likely 
to be fewer findings of infringement.  Even when there is an 
infringement finding in a district court, injunctive relief will be granted 
less frequently in those cases.  Thus, the frequency of Type II errors 
across all patent cases would decline.72 
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One additional benefit of this approach is that it would return uniformity to 
the patent system and avoid the destructive tendency towards forum 
shopping, the very thing the CAFC was set up to avoid. 
4. Make the ITC formally subject to the eBay factors. 
 Hahn and Singer, among others, suggest that the ITC be made 
formally subject to the eBay factors.73  This could be done through decisions 
of the CAFC or the Supreme Court, using the arguments and interpretations 
offered in Part II of this Article.  Alternatively, it could be done 
legislatively. 
C. Specific Reforms Relating to Open Innovation 
1. The Balance-of-Hardships Factor Should Focus on the Decentralized 
Nature of Open Innovation Networks. 
 The goal of the eBay factors is to take equitable account of context. 
Open innovation occurs in the context of heterogeneous networks of 
developers who all have access to a shared open resource.  This point is 
relevant to the balance-of-hardships factor in a number of ways.  First, 
members of open networks may not be able to use the patent pooling and 
mutual assured destruction strategies that large firms can employ to offset 
the dangers posed by vague and low-quality patents. Even where the 
network includes large players who are willing to “protect the ecosystem,” 
the smaller members of the network will not have the same degree of 
protection—particularly if they are singled out for suit.  Second, members 
of open networks are much more vulnerable to being picked off by claims 
of infringement backed by injunctive threat.  There are coordination costs to 
defending the network, and courts need to take account of those costs 
whenever considering an injunction.  Third, it is simply harder—and in 
many cases impossible—for members of a decentralized network to 
guarantee a new product cannot be subject to hold-up by a lurking patent 
holder.  As a result, courts should look more favorably on requests for stays 
pending redesign. 
2. The Public Interest Factor Should Take Account of the Type of 
Competition Open Innovation Provides. 
 Both eBay and the courts since eBay have stressed that it is 
important to take account of the type of competition and the market position 
of the parties.  Most obviously, this is done when district courts refuse to 
give injunctions in cases not involving direct competitors.  The public 
interest in having access to the technology generally outweighs the 
plaintiff’s interest in an injunction if the plaintiff is not a direct competitor 
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with the defendant.  But the “type of competition” concern is broader.  As 
this Article explains, open innovation offers some unique pro-competitive 
and pro-consumer advantages, particularly in industries involving network 
effects.  Even if a dominant standard is established, so long as the standard 
is open, there can be no monopolist extracting rent and locking users into 
suboptimal designs because of the costs of switching.  Low-cost or no-cost 
versions of the good can be made available, and multiple innovators can 
tinker with the innovation, offering the public choice and the virtue of 
incremental improvement.  Further, as Benkler explains, in many situations 
open innovation allows a more efficient innovation process precisely 
because transparency allows better allocation of productive resources.  
Faced with all these advantages, courts should construe the public interest in 
technological access particularly broadly in the case of suits involving open 
innovation products. 
CONCLUSION 
 In August of 2011, Google purchased Motorola Mobility for $12.5 
billion.74  The move followed the acquisition of a collection of Nortel 
patents by Microsoft, Apple, and a consortium of others for $4.5 billion in 
July.75  In the coverage of these events, reporters, lawyers, and industry 
insiders all took for granted that the real point of the acquisitions was not to 
purchase patents over innovative new technology so that these companies 
could begin to create that technology for themselves—though technology 
creation is the classic role that we assume patents play in the innovation 
economy.  Indeed, many insiders believed Google would end up discarding 
Motorola’s actual phone business, keeping only its collection of patents.  
The point was to acquire the means to guarantee mutual assured destruction 
in the event of a patent war, to “defend the ecosystem” by acquiring a large 
portfolio of patents.  The participants actually explicitly admitted as much.76  
What was in those patent portfolios?  What did the patents really cover?  
How many of them were actually valid?  The answers to all those questions 
were impressionistic at best. 
 What was striking about these purchases is that both participants 
and observers seemed to share a set of premises.  Of course the patents were 
vague and, in many cases, of low quality.  Of course any competent lawyer 
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could make a case that any complex handset device was potentially 
infringing hundreds of patents, or that it was not.  Of course each device 
would potentially “read on” thousands of patents, to the point where even 
the most assiduous legal department could not guarantee there was no 
patent holder waiting for product release so that it could sue and gain the 
benefits of “hold-up.”  Of course some of the patents were not over 
technologies per se, but rather over vaguely described “methods of 
operation” that in years past would have been rejected as unpatentable 
subject matter.  Of course it was worth spending billions of dollars, not to 
acquire intellectual property rights that would in fact enable growth and job-
generating innovation, but simply to create a form of legal insurance—a 
protection payment made in advance to ward off the very real danger of 
being mugged by the patent system.  The level of acceptance of these 
premises was evident in the fact that the participants did not even complain 
about siphoning billions of dollars from productive investment into 
overpriced legal insurance.  They were used to it.  It was just a cost of doing 
business.  That fact may actually be the most profound condemnation of the 
problems with our patent system,77 problems that recent reforms have begun 
to address but have certainly not resolved. 
A. The Role of Injunctions 
 The point at which the abstract problems in the patent system 
become concrete for high technology companies is at the moment suit is 
filed and an injunction demanded.  A point was made in the last section that 
bears reiterating here. Plaintiffs should have injunctive relief available as a 
remedy if a clear, high-quality patent is definitely being violated, if the 
plaintiff truly is being irreparably harmed, if the balance of hardships favors 
the plaintiff, and if there are no public interest factors that militate against 
an injunction.  The reason controversies over this issue are currently so 
heated is that each one of those requirements is frequently missing in high 
technology markets.  There is no better indication of that fact than the 
Nortel and Motorola purchases. 
 Of course, solving the problems in the patent system will require far 
deeper reforms than merely tweaking the standards for patent injunctions.  
Yet comprehensive reforms take a long time.  In the meantime, changes in 
the practice of granting injunctive relief—along the lines signaled by the 
Supreme Court in eBay—can actually accomplish a great deal.  The factors 
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the Court laid out and the reforms suggested in Part IV of this paper—the 
focus on direct competition, the possibility of staying injunctive orders to 
allow redesign, the attention paid to the public interest in the availability of 
technology, and the presence of competition—are not substitutes for patent 
reform, but they do allow courts and, for that matter, the ITC to replace the 
sledgehammer of the injunction with a more scalpel-like remedy.  That 
would be a good thing even in an entirely well functioning patent system.  
In our current patent system, it is a necessity. 
B. Open Innovation and its Discontents 
 If all high technology business methods are harmed to some extent 
by the profusion of low-quality, vague patents that make it very difficult to 
practice strongly cumulative innovation, open source creativity is 
particularly vulnerable.  There is no guarantee that there will be a Google 
standing in the wings to protect an open source network and no guarantee, 
even if there is, that the large company’s interests will always align with the 
interests of the network or of the larger society. 
 This Article expanded on three particular aspects of open 
innovation relevant to patent and competition policy. 
• Its beneficial competitive effect on markets otherwise 
reliant on proprietary systems, particularly when 
network effects are involved. 
• The openness, transparency, and non-exclusivity of the 
innovation process. 
• The vulnerabilities of any open innovation system that 
relies on a heterogeneous network of developers. 
These factors are of profound importance to the decision to grant 
injunctions.  The reforms suggested in Part IV of this Article would 
encourage courts and agencies to look at the quality and type of competition 
that open innovation brings to a marketplace, to focus on the public interest 
in access to open technology, and to consider the balance of hardships that 
specifically affect open innovation networks. 
 Patent injunctions are important.  They are, and should be, a way in 
which patent holders can protect themselves from infringement.  Yet, in a 
world where companies are spending billions of dollars to purchase patent 
portfolios, not to use the patented innovations, but solely to defend 
themselves against spurious suit by recourse to mutual assured destruction, 
we have clear evidence that the patent system is malfunctioning.  In that 
world, patent injunctions cannot issue automatically lest the existing 
gridlock be made even worse, harming competition, the American 
consumer, and the cause of open innovation itself. 
